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INTRODUCTION

On May 1, 2012, President Obama announced that U.S. forces
would continue their phased withdrawal from Afghanistan such that
by the end of 2014, Afghan security forces will have full responsibility
for their country’s security.1 Of particular note, the President’s speech
was directed solely at an American audience with very little attention
paid to either Afghan sentiment or the Afghan people’s needs. The
unidirectional nature of the President’s focus was inadvertently
evidenced when, on Afghan soil, he closed the speech by stating:
* Assistant Professor of Law, Lincoln Memorial University-Duncan School of
Law. The author would like to dedicate this piece to his darling Melanie.
See Mark Landler, Obama Signs Pact in Kabul, Turning Page in Afghan War,
N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/02/world/
asia/obama-lands-in-kabul-on-unannouncedvisit.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; see also David E. Sanger, Charting Obama’s
Journey to a Shift on Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/20/us/obamas-journey-to-reshapeafghanistan-war.html?hp.
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“May God bless our troops and may God bless the United States of
America.”2
The President’s words did not evidence any
acknowledgement that an expression of American solicitude for
Afghan well-being might equally be in the American people’s
interests. Indeed, throughout the War on Terror, American policy
objectives have been hamstrung by an almost exclusive focus on
domestic American public opinion and a complete failure to address
the international community’s perception of U.S policies.3 The
international community’s suspicions as to American good faith was
exacerbated by the February 2012 accidental incineration of Korans at
the U.S. Air Force Base in Bagram, Afghanistan4 and the March 2012
killing of sixteen Afghan civilians, allegedly by U.S. Army Sergeant
Robert Bales.5
Both the President’s May 1, 2012 speech and the preceding
tragic events highlight the precarious position of U.S. forces in
Afghanistan. Though U.S. forces are necessary to protect President
Hamid Karzai’s government from the Taliban insurgency, the United
States’ continued presence in the country has led to widespread anger
by Afghans and members of the global community who perceive that
U.S. forces show insufficient concern for civilian welfare.6 On May 18,
Address to the Nation on Military Operations in Afghanistan from Bagram
Air Base, Afghanistan, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 336 (May 2, 2012).
3 See Dr. Steven Kull, Dir., Program on Int’l Policy Attitudes (PIPA), and
Editor, WorldPublicOpinion.org, America's Image in the World, Address
Before House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International
Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight (Mar. 6, 2007) (transcript
available at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/views_
on_countriesregions_bt/326.php?nid=&id=&pnt=326).
4 See Babrak Miakhel, Six Dead in Afghanistan Koran Burning Protests, BBC
NEWS (Feb. 22, 2012, 10:39 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia17123464.
5 See James Dao, U.S. Identifies Army Sergeant in Killing of 16 in Afghanistan,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/world/
asia/afghan-shooting-suspect-identified-as-army-staff-sgt-robertbales.html?pagewanted=all.
6 See Ahmad Nadem & Ahmad Haroon, Afghans Urge U.S. Exit After Killings;
U.S. Says Timetable Unchanged, REUTERS, Mar. 12, 2012, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/12/us-afghanistan-civiliansidUSBRE82A02V20120312.
2
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2012, the newly elected French President, Francois Hollande,
informed President Obama that France would be withdrawing the
majority of its 3,400 forces stationed in Afghanistan by the year’s end.7
The French withdrawal and reluctance by other NATO allies to
contribute to the Afghan anti-insurgency campaign is largely
attributable to the international community’s view that U.S. policy is
based on domestic politics alone with insufficient solicitude shown
for either Afghan civilian well-being or the concerns of world public
opinion.8 These perceptions will make it more difficult for the Obama
administration and its successor to effectively disengage from the
Middle East and South Asia, share the costs of international security
with its allies, and address long-neglected domestic problems. 9
The United States’ national interest has traditionally been
international stability, free markets, and democratization. During
much of the twentieth century, the United States was the
indispensable nation that intervened at critical moments to assure the
modern, increasingly democratic, and globalized world. Although
these priorities remain, the United States has a further interest in
seeing a shift in the global paradigm from a unipolar world, in which
it bears nearly all the diplomatic and military costs of ensuring
continued globalization, to a multi-polar world, in which it is, if
anything, first among equals.10 This process, however, is crippled by
the United States’ continued military presence in both South Asia and

Dan Robinson, Hollande Meets Obama, Reaffirms Early Afghanistan
Withdrawal, VOICE OF AMERICA (May 18, 2012), http://www.voanews.com/
content/article/727271.html.
8 See Sanger, supra note 1; see also Tom Engelhardt, Predator Drone Nation, THE
NATION (May 14, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/167868/
predator-drone-nation.
9 See Jane Kelly, Australian Ambassador Lauds U.S. Strategic Shift, UVA TODAY
(Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.virginia.edu/uvatoday/newsRelease.
php?id=17888; see also James Kitfield, Geopolitical Shift: Old Europe to New
Asia?, NAT’L J. NAT’L SEC. EXPERTS BLOG (Nov. 8, 2010, 10:19 AM),
http://security.nationaljournal.com/2010/11/geopolitical-shift-oldeurope.php.
10 See DAVID E. SANGER, THE INHERITANCE: THE WORLD OBAMA CONFRONTS
AND THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICAN POWER p. 471 (Three Rivers Press 2009).
7
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the Middle East and the United States’ excessive focus on the War on
Terror.11 Although the United States has sincerely sought to engender
both democracy and pluralism in these regions, spending billions of
dollars to develop civilian infrastructure in both Iraq and Afghanistan
and never seeking to acquire territory for itself, its perceived rejection
of world public opinion and international legal norms has harmed
both its international reputation and its ability to “turn the page” and
effectively disengage.12 President Abraham Lincoln engaged in a civil
war with a wholly different purpose and context from today’s
circumstances. However, Lincoln did have similar hurdles to
overcome, including massive military resistance and opposition to his
goal of preserving the Union. Although his handling of the Civil War
was not without error or controversy, there are lessons to be learned
from Lincoln in terms of both his actions and his mistakes, given to us
in hindsight. As set forth below, U.S. policy makers can look to
Lincoln’s legacy to improve its image - and thus its credibility - on the
international scene.

I. THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 TERRORIST ATTACKS

The Al Qaeda terrorist organization, based at the time in
Afghanistan, tragically attacked United States civilian infrastructure
on September 11, 2001. Nineteen Al Qaeda terrorists hijacked four
passenger jets, crashed two of them into the twin towers of the World
Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon in Arlington,
Virginia and a fourth into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, after
See Anne Applebaum, The Worst Mistake America Made After 9/11: How
Focusing Too Much on the War on Terror Undermined Our Economy and Global
Power, SLATE (Sept. 4, 2011, 7:13 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/foreigners/2011/09/the_worst_mistake_america_made_
after_911.html.
12 David Cole, After September 11: What We Still Don’t Know, N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS, (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives
/2011/sep/29/after-september-11-what-we-still-dont-know/
?pagination=false.
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WAR ON TERROR – LESSONS FROM LINCOLN

17

passengers attempted to take control before the plane could reach the
terrorists’ intended target in Washington, D.C. The 9/11 attacks led
to the killing of nearly 3,000 civilians on American soil13 and caused
trillions of dollars in damage to the United States economy.14 Indeed,
in the first days after the terrorist attacks, the perception was that up
many more innocent civilians had been killed in the attacks than was
actually the case.15
In the immediate aftermath, the international community
rallied around the United States and its people. Of note, the United
Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1368 that
unequivocally condemned the terrorist attacks and expressed the
Security Council’s readiness “to take all necessary steps to respond to
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of
terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of
the United Nations.”16 Perhaps the world’s most prestigious nonEnglish language newspaper, the French daily “Le Monde” published
a September 12, 2001 cover article titled “Nous sommes tous
Américains” in support of the American people.17 Indeed, public
manifestations of sympathy with the American people arose
immediately and spontaneously not only in industrialized and

9/11 Investigation (PENTTBOM), FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/history/famous-cases/9-11-investigation (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
14 See Shan Carter & Amanda Cox, One 9/11 Talley: $3.3 Trillion, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/09/08/us/sept11-reckoning/cost-graphic.html?_r=0.
15 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES,
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 292 (2004), available at http://www.911commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.
16 S.C. Res. 1368, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); see also Press
Release, Security Council, Security Council Condemns, ‘In Strongest Terms,’
Terrorist Attacks on United States, U.N. Press Release SC/7143 (Sept. 12,
2001), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/
SC7143.doc.htm.
17 See Jean-Marie Colombani, Nous Sommes Tous Américains [We are all
Americans], LE MONDE, May 23, 2007, http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/
article/2007/05/23/nous-sommes-tous-americains_913706_3232.html (Fr.).
13
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mature democracies, but also in Russia, China, Iran, Kuwait and
India.18
With strong evidence that Al Qaeda was responsible,
President George W. Bush, on September 20, 2001, demanded the
Taliban government in Afghanistan turn over Al Qaeda leaders,
including its head, Osama bin Laden, to avoid a United States
invasion of Afghanistan.19 President Bush’s ultimatum was issued
based on Congress’ September 14, 2001 Authorization for Military
Force against Terrorists that was signed into law by President Bush on
September 18, 2001. The invasion of Afghanistan, which commenced
on October 7, 2001 and followed the Taliban’s refusal to turn bin
Laden directly over to the United States,20 was most likely legal under
international law as an act of self-defense authorized by Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter.21

II. THE AFGHANISTAN WAR

With the help of the Northern Alliance, the United States
easily defeated the Taliban government of Mullah Omar and created

See Haley Sweetland Edwards, We Are All Americans: The World’s Response
to 9/11, MENTAL_FLOSS (Sept. 9, 2011, 4:04 PM),
http://www.mentalfloss.com/blogs/archives/99665.
19 See Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States
Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 Weekly Comp. Pres.
Doc. 1347 (Sept. 20, 2001); see also Bush Delivers Ultimatum, CNN (Sept. 20,
2001), http://articles.cnn.com/2001-09-20/world/ret.afghan.bush_1_seniortaliban-official-terrorist-ringleader-osama-bin-mullah-mohammedomar?_s=PM:asiapcf.
20 See Taliban Won’t Turn Over Bin Laden, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/09/11/world/main310852.shtml.
21 See U.N. Charter art. 51, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/
charter/chapter7.shtml; see also Ben Smith & Arabella Thorp, The Legal Basis
for the Invasion of Afghanistan (House of Commons Library Standard Note
SN/IA/5340, Feb. 26, 2010), available at www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/SN05340.pdf.
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an Afghan Interim Authority, which in turn led to the establishment
of a government under the Presidency of Hamid Karzai.22
Since the invasion and subsequent transfer of power to the
Karzai Government, the United States and its NATO allies shifted
focus and relocated troops to Iraq. This arguably facilitated the
Taliban’s ability to reconstitute itself and launch a vicious war against
both NATO and Afghan forces for control of the country.
The Obama administration maintains that this deliberate move
away from Afghanistan was a mistake, both because it was the base of
Al-Qaeda’s operations and because of the country’s proximity to
Pakistan.23 While the troop surge of 2010 likely stabilized the
predicament of the Karzai government, it has been accompanied by
increased wariness about the rise in civilian casualties.
The
effectiveness of United States forces in Afghanistan is limited by the
perception they operate at the expense of the Afghan people’s wellbeing and safety.24 This concern is exacerbated by the Obama
administration’s expanded use of Predator Drones within the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border region to kill suspected terrorists,
regardless of the effects of such policies on innocent lives. As
Professor Samuel Vincent Jones writes:
The high number of civilian casualties has
severely
undermined
support
for
U.S.
counterinsurgency programs and the Afghan
government itself. Protection of the Afghan civilian
populace is critically necessary to regaining their active
and continued support for the Afghan government,

See Britannica.com, Hamid Karzai,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/761104/Hamid-Karzai (last
vistied Dec. 2, 2013).
23 Sanger, supra note 1; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF SOUTH AND
CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. Relations with Afghanistan (Sept. 6, 2012),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm.
24 See Laura King, U.S.-Afghan Divide Seen in Perceptions of Village Massacre,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/17/world/
la-fg-afghanistan-killings-20120318.
22

20

1 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2013)
and it is essential to depriving the Taliban of its
authority and appeal.25

Reversing the continued erosion of support among Afghans
for the Karzai government has proved elusive, largely due to the
Karzai government’s inability to protect the Afghan people from
either Taliban insurgents or U.S. forces.

III. USE OF GUANTANAMO BAY AS A DETENTION FACILITY

During the Afghanistan invasion, U.S. forces took custody of
hundreds of individuals on Afghan soil and transferred many of these
detainees to the Camp X-Ray (and subsequently Camp Delta)
detention facility situated within the United States’ Guantanamo Bay
Naval Station in Cuba.26 The reason why “GITMO” was chosen as the
detention facility is largely because the Bush administration believed
prisoners held on Cuban soil would not have habeas corpus rights
under the United States Constitution to challenge the legality of their
detention as enemy combatants in U.S. federal court.
These
controversial detentions engendered further international enmity
when the Bush administration asserted the detainees, as “enemy
combatants,” need not be afforded the protections of the Geneva
Conventions because such protections only apply to uniformed
soldiers.27

Samuel Vincent Jones, The Ethics of Letting Civilians Die in Afghanistan: The
False Dichotomy Between Hobbesian and Kantian Rescue Paradigms, 59 DEPAUL L.
REV. 899, 901-02 (2010).
26 See Briannica.com, Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1503067/Guantanmo-Baydetention-camp (last visited Dec. 2, 2013).
27 Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's
"Extraordinary Rendition" Program, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/02/14/050214fa_fact6.
25
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The detentions were further delegitimized by allegations of
systematic torture against detainees by U.S. forces.28 Indeed, a leaked
International Committee of the Red Cross report of July 2004 cited the
United States for forcing prisoners to suffer “humiliating acts, solitary
confinement, temperature extremes, [and] use of forced positions.”29
Many released prisoners complained of having suffered beatings,
sleep deprivation, prolonged constraint in uncomfortable positions,
prolonged hooding, sexual and cultural humiliation, and other
physical and psychological mistreatment during their detention.30
A May 2007 United Nations Human Rights Council Report
stated the United States violated international law, particularly the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and disputed the
Bush Administration’s authority to try Guantanamo Bay prisoners as
enemy combatants in military tribunals. As stated by the International
Committee for the Red Cross, the body charged with monitoring
compliance with the Geneva Conventions:

Every person in enemy hands must have some status
under international law: he is either a prisoner of war
and, as such, covered by the Third Convention, a
civilian covered by the Fourth Convention, or again, a
member of the medical personnel of the armed forces
who is covered by the First Convention. There is no
intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can be
outside the law.31

Giles Tremlett, Spanish Court Opens Investigation of Guantánamo Torture
Allegations, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 29, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2009/apr/29/spain-court-guantanamo-detainees-torture.
29 Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/30/politics/
30gitmo.html.
30 Id.
31 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
28
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Notwithstanding the United States Government’s claims to the
contrary, the Supreme Court, in three cases decided on June 28, 2004,
determined the Guantanamo Bay detainees should have access to
federal courts. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court held that an American
citizen apprehended in Afghanistan and held as an enemy combatant
must be accorded due process and a meaningful factual hearing as to
his enemy combatant status.32 In Rumsfeld v. Padilla,33 although the
Court held the lower court lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner’s
habeas corpus petition, it signaled the government has no authority to
detain an American citizen arrested on United States soil as an enemy
combatant.34 Finally, in Rasul v. Bush, the Court held that those being
detained in Guantanamo Bay can have their habeas corpus petitions
heard in United States federal courts.35 These decisions, the Supreme
Court’s first rulings about the government’s actions in the war on
terrorism since the 9/11 attacks, were a political intervention by the
judicial branch intended to remediate concerns the Bush
Administration acted outside the requirements of both American and
international jurisprudence.36 Four years later, in Boumediene v.
Bush,37 the Court concluded the United States’ denial of habeas corpus
rights to non-citizens held as enemy combatants in Guantanamo Bay
violated the Constitution’s suspension clause because Congress had
not suspended this right under its Article 1 authority.
Further undermining support for Bush’s War on Terror was
the administration’s use of “enhanced interrogation,” or torture, to
obtain probative information needed to both apprehend existing
terrorists and prevent further terrorist attacks.38 Merits aside,
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
34 Nancy Morawetz, Detention Decisions and Access to Habeas Corpus for
Immigrants Facing Deportation, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 13, 14 (2005).
35 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004).
36 Cole, supra note 12; Linda Greenhouse, Goodbye Gitmo, OPINIONATOR (May
16, 2012, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/
goodbye-to-gitmo/?hp.
37 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008).
38 See generally JOSE A. RODRIGUEZ , JR. WITH BILL HARLOW, HARD MEASURES:
HOW AGGRESSIVE CIA ACTIONS AFTER 9/11 SAVED AMERICAN LIVES 263
32
33
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American government officials failed to anticipate domestic and
international resistance to its interrogation methods.39
Recognizing the worldwide negative reaction to continued use
of Guantanamo Bay as a detention facility for alleged enemy
combatants, President Obama sought to close the facility. Attorney
General Eric Holder announced that the accused co-conspirators of
the terrorist attacks would be tried in civilian federal district court,
while other alleged offenders would be tried by military commission.
In the face of strong domestic opposition to both proposals, the
Obama administration has since backtracked.40 Although this might
have been necessitated by domestic politics, it can be argued the
decision has worsened the United States' standing within the
international community, which sees the use of military justice as
both illegitimate and predetermined.41

IV. THE IRAQI INVASION AND PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE IRAQI
OCCUPATION

Shortly after the Iraq occupation, and notwithstanding the fact
that neither the United States nor its allies had captured any senior
members of Al Qaeda, the Bush administration shifted its focus to
(Threshold Editions 2012) (discussing enhanced interrogation techniques in
the wake of the attacks on 9/11); http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/10/
world/10tapes.html?_r=0
39 See 9/11 and the War on Terror: Polls Show What People Think 10 Years Later,
WASHINGTON’S BLOG (Sept. 10, 2011), http://www.washingtonsblog.com/
2011/09/911-and-the-war-on-terror-polls-show-what-people-really-believe10-years-later.html.
40 Evan Perez, U.S. Reverses on 9/11 Trials, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748703806304576242763782267
924.html.
41 Sara Sorcher, Insiders: Military Justice Capable of Fair Trial for Suspect in of
Afghan Shooting, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Mar. 27, 2012, available at
http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/insiders-military-justicesystem-capable-of-fair-trial-for-suspect-of-afghan-shooting-20120326.
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“regime change” in Iraq, defined as the forcible removal of the
murderous totalitarian regime of then-President Saddam Hussein.42
The Bush Administration’s reasons for the invasion were
based on a claim that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and
was, therefore, in violation of existing United Nations Security
Council Resolutions.43 In the process, President Bush and his
administration threatened the United Nations Security Council to
prove its relevance by authorizing the use of force against Iraq, all the
while letting it be known the United States was prepared to use
military force without United Nations approval to do so.44 This
position was contrary to international law, as Iraq posed no direct
threat to the United States and, therefore, did not provide the United
States with authority to undertake a unilateral invasion of Iraq based
on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.45 Indeed, the United
States, after going to the United Nations Security Council to request
authorization to invade Iraq on the grounds of Iraq’s failure to disarm
itself of Weapons of Mass Destruction, chose to bypass the
intergovernmental body when it became clear that its request for such
authority would be voted down by both the Security’s Council’s
Permanent Members and the body as a whole after the United
Nations Chief Weapons Inspector, Hans Blix, presented the Council
with a February 14, 2003 report contradicting many United States'
claims.46 Indeed, when the United States invasion of Iraq began on
Joseph Cirincione, Origins of Regime Change in Iraq, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
19, 2003),
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/ 2003/03/19/origins-of-regimechange-in-iraq/4pr.
43 Seymour M. Hersh, Selective Intelligence: Donald Rumsfeld Has His Own
Special Sources. Are They Reliable?, THE NEW YORKER, May 12, 2003, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/05/12/030512fa_fact.
44 Agence France Presse, Bush Threatened Nations That Did Not Back Iraq War:
Report, GOOGLE NEWS (Sept. 26, 2007), http://afp.google.com/article/
ALeqM5g3bV2LfRcSgbK7btDtgfbe2NGt8Q (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
45 Rachel S. Taylor, The United Nations, International Law, and the War in Iraq,
WORLD PRESS REVIEW, http://worldpress.org/specials/iraq/ (last visited
Apr. 16, 2013).
46 Dr. Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Briefing of the Security
Council, 14 February 2003: An Update on Inspections, UNITED NATIONS
42

FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE (Mar.
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March 19, 2003, nearly the entire international political community
was opposed to the endeavor.47 The United States' strongest ally in
the invasion, the United Kingdom, did pursue a policy of strategic
cooperation with the United States, but U.K. public opinion was
heavily lopsided against United States policy, with a large majority of
Britons opposed to the war from the start. A January 2007 BBC World
Service Poll evidenced that seventy three percent of the world’s
population in twenty five countries disapproved of U.S. policy in Iraq.
Lack of global public support greatly harmed the ability of the
United States to democratize Iraq in a peaceful manner, and the
United States was seen by key elements of Iraqi society as an invader
and an occupier as opposed to a liberating force.48 Moreover,
mistakes made by the United States-led Coalition Provisional
Authority that eventually handed over control of Iraq to the Iraqi
government, led to both anarchy and communal violence throughout
the country that was propitiated by insufficient U.S. occupation
forces.49 The consequences of these mistakes, arguably violations of
the Fourth Geneva Convention, continue to persist as Iraq remains
prone to high levels of communal violence.50

MONITORING, VERIFICATION AND INSPECTION COMMISSION (Feb. 14, 2003),
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/pages/security_
council_briefings.asp# 6; see also Ronan Bennett, Ten Days to War, THE
GUARDIAN, Mar. 7, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/
08/iraq.unitednations; Hans Blix's Briefing to the Security Council, THE
GUARDIAN, Feb. 14, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/
feb/14/iraq.unitednations1.
47 See Britannica.com, Iraq War,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/870845/Iraq-War (last
visited Dec. 2, 2013).
48 Cesar G. Soriano & Steven Komarow, Poll: Iraqis Out of Patience, USA
TODAY, Apr. 30, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/200404-28-poll-cover_x.htm.
49 Anthony H. Cordesman, American Strategic, Tactical, and Other Mistakes in
Iraq: A Litany of Errors, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUD (Apr. 19, 2006),
available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060419_iraqlitany.pdf.
50 UN: Attacks Killed 613 Civilians in Iraq in January-March 2012, TREND (Apr.
10, 2012), http://en.trend.az/regions/met/iraq/2012895.html.
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V. AMERICAN ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN IRAQ

The United States did accomplish a great deal in Iraq. It
removed the murderous Ba’athist Government of President Saddam
Hussein from power. It also commenced a process of democratization
that could, for the first time, see a genuine democracy emerge in an
area that was once the Abbasid Caliphate’s capital.51 The Arab Spring
of 2011 manifested that democratization does have great resonance
within the Arab world, despite the flawed predictions of the war’s
strongest proponents.52 To the Bush administration’s credit, the
United States disregarded the bipartisan Iraq Study Group’s
recommendation and implemented a “surge” of American forces to
provide much-needed protection to Iraqis against insurgents in both
Baghdad and Al-Anbar province in 2007.53 It is important to
recognize these actions as achievements and also as tacit recognition
that mistakes were made. Unfortunately, they may have been too
little too late. The Administration’s unilateral and extra-legal
invasion alienated world public opinion and will most likely prevent
the international community and Iraqi civil society from closer
rapprochement with the United States for the foreseeable future.
Indeed, by most accounts, the current Iraqi Government of Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s closest bilateral relationship is with the
Islamic Republic of Iran, a country that is vehemently opposed to U.S.
interests.54

David Frum, Will Iraq’s Democracy Vindicate Bush?, CNN OPINION (Mar. 8,
2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-03-08/opinion/frum.iraq.election_
1_polling-stations-elections-voting-procedure?_s=PM:OPINION.
52 Sarina A. Beges, Stanford Scholars Reflect on Arab Spring, STANFORD NEWS
SERVICE (Jan. 25, 2012), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2012/january/
arab-spring-anniversary-012512.html.
53 Bob Woodward, Why Did Violence Plummet? It Wasn't Just the Surge, WASH.
POST, Sept. 8, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/09/07/AR2008090701847.html.
54 David S. Cloud, As U.S. Prepares to Leave Iraq, Iran's Shadow Looms Large,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/14/
world/la-fg-1114-us-iran-20111114.
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Although Iraq may, in time, turn into a functioning and
prosperous democracy, it must be recognized that between March
2003 and July 2007, violence stemming from United States combat
operations in Iraq caused the death of an estimated 125,000 to 600,000
Iraqi civilians.55 Approximately 2.7 million Iraqis have been
internally displaced by violence that followed the U.S.
invasion and occupation and a further 1.7 million Iraqis
have fled the conflict in Iraq, with the majority taking
refuge in Syria and Jordan, and lesser numbers to Egypt,
Lebanon, Iran, and Turkey. 56 In all, well over 4 million Iraqis
sought refuge in other Middle Eastern countries or were internally
displaced.57 These figures are either unknown or irrelevant to United
States political culture, which instead focuses almost exclusively on
American casualties in considering the War’s legitimacy. The relative
American disregard for Iraqi civilian suffering has both delegitimized
its claim to have been acting in the Iraqi people’s best interest and
placed it at odds with its obligations under the Fourth Geneva
Conventions. This, as set forth more fully below, distinguishes
American actions in Iraq from its actions during the Civil War.

VI. PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE PLANNED WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ
AND AFGHANISTAN

The Obama administration has sought to reengage with the
international community to engender assistance with a planned
disengagement from the Middle East and South Asia. Both domestic
and international policies, however, have made a reversal of public
See Les Roberts et al., Mortality Before and After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq:
Cluster Sample Survey, 364 THE LANCET 1857 (Nov. 2004), available at
http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~chazelle/politics/bib/lancet.pdf; see also
Jones, supra note 25, at 900. See also http://www.iraqbodycount.org/
56 THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY, 2013 UNHCR COUNTRY OPERATIONS PROFILE –
IRAQ, available at http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486426.html (last visited
Nov. 12, 2013).
57 Jones, supra note 25, at 900 and
55
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opinion difficult to attain. At home, political constraints have
prevented the Administration from both closing the detention facility
at Guantanamo Bay and from trying suspected terrorists in United
States civilian courts.58 Overseas, the United States has increased its
use of Predator Drones to kill suspected terrorists, notwithstanding
the consequent deaths of South Asian civilians and a further
perception the United States is a party to indiscriminate killings.59
The use of Drones in warfare is problematic under international law.
Professor Heinz Klug writes:
While “collateral damage” is acknowledged as an
inevitable consequence of military action, a unique
feature of “smart” weapons, and particularly the
Predator UAV, is that the individual target is identified
and hit in real time with a degree of certainty rare in
the history of modern warfare. Outside of a theater of
combat—defined by time and place—the targeting of
individuals for elimination, particularly if they are not
openly armed or engaged in a certain level of hostilities
at the time, without an attempt to apprehend them or
to give them a chance to surrender, could be
considered murder under the Geneva Conventions.60
Most recently, the United States has been involved in “regime
change” in Libya, and has mooted an invasion of the Islamic Republic
of Iran, largely at the Israeli government of Prime Minister Binyamin
Netanyahu and the United States pro-Israel lobby’s behest.61 The
Scott Shane & Mark Landler, Obama Clears Way for Guantánamo Trials, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/08/world/
americas/08guantanamo.html.
59 Jane Mayer, Jane Mayer: Predator Versus International Law, THE NEW YORKER
(Oct. 29, 2009),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2009/10/janemayer-predator-versus-international-law.html.
60 Heinz Klug, The Rule of Law, War, or Terror, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 365, 381-82
(2003).
61 Steve Kingstone, Netanyahu Talks Tough in Obama Iran Meeting, BBC NEWS
(Mar. 6, 2012, 2:23 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada17260083; Dana Milbank, AIPAC Beats the Drums of War, WASH. POST, Mar. 5,
2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/aipac-beats-the-drumsof-war/2012/03/05/gIQASVMZtR_story.html.
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American policy of forcing the Islamic Republic to completely
renounce its nuclear program is delegitimized by the fate of the
Gaddafi regime in Libya, which previously gave up its nuclear
weapons program, and by the relatively restrained United States
policy towards Pakistan and North Korea, both of which possess
substantial nuclear weapon arsenals.62 All of this must be seen
through the prism of the world following the financial crisis, in which
much of the international community blames the United States
government’s loose regulatory paradigm for plunging the world into
a near-depression and for acting as a predatory, as opposed to
benevolent, hegemon that is incapable of addressing its pronounced
domestic problems. In short, the United States has ceased to be the
focus of global aspirations, well symbolized in the early 1990s, when
Filipino demonstrators carried signs reading “Yankee Go Home —
and take me with you.”63
Where did things go wrong? What caused the United States to
go from the leading liberal democracy whose hard and soft power
enabled it to lead the Western world in its confrontation with the Axis
Powers, Soviet Communism and beyond, to a country viewed
globally with skepticism and distrust?

VII. AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Many on the political right justifiably posit that much of this
skepticism is nothing more than parochial anti-Americanism, brought
about by worldwide envy at American wealth and power. Indeed,
many conservatives, including the neoconservative scholar Robert
Kagan, claim this anti-Americanism is a concomitant of the United
62 Fredrik Dahl, Analysis: Libya Conflict May Strengthen Iran Nuclear Defiance,
REUTERS, Mar. 24, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/
03/24/us-iran-libya-nuclear-idUSTRE72N4WH20110324.
63 Edwin Kiester, Jr. & Sally Valente Kiester, Yankee Go Home — And Take Me
With You!, SMITHSONIAN MAG., May 1999, available at
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/philips-abstract.html.
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States being the only first-world nation that uses hard or military
power to police the international system.64 This is a position worthy
of further discussion and elaboration beyond the scope of this paper.

VIII. PROBLEMS RELATED TO ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

In reality, there is more at work here than mere parochial
envy. The problem stems from an almost pathological obsession with
domestic politics in formulating U.S foreign policy, in conjunction
with the United States being confronted, for the first time, with a form
of asymmetric warfare against terrorist adversaries, who profit from
and take shelter in failed states such as Afghanistan, portions of
Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen and beyond. As a result, the U.S.’s success
in this endeavor is not only based on its military successes, but on
engendering international cooperation and good will in an effort to
both isolate and defeat anti-civilizational terrorist networks and their
allies. This, of course, requires the United States to prevent these
organizations from replenishing their membership via recruitment.
This was well-enunciated by former Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld, who, in an internal October 16, 2003 memorandum to
General Richard Myers, Paul Wolfowitz, and Douglas Feith, wrote the
following:
Today, we lack metrics to know if we are
winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we
capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more
terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical
clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against
us?
Does the US need to fashion a broad, integrated
plan to stop the next generation of terrorists? The US is
putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan,
Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, 113 POL’Y REV. (June 2002), available at
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/7107.
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but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to
stop terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our
cost is billions against the terrorists' costs of millions.65
The United States, however, has approached the “War on
Terror” solely through the prism of domestic politics and has
needlessly alienated large segments of the international community
by its failure to address the concerns of global public opinion. Its
decision to both threaten and then bypass the United Nations Security
Council, its use of Camp X-Ray and Guantanamo Bay to detain
enemy combatants, its use of enhanced interrogation measures,
“rendition” and Predator Drones66 are all actions that have had
significant domestic support, but which have alienated key
international constituencies. A year 2010 University of Maryland Poll
of Arab public opinion, conducted by Zogby International, evidences
continued antipathy towards the U.S.67
To borrow the title of the Russian novelist Nikolai
Chernyshevsky’s nineteenth century novel, “What is to be done?”
Certainly the 9/11 terrorist attacks were shockingly destructive to
both American life and property. Moreover, it is unequivocally true
that Al-Qaeda would certainly have attacked the United States again
were the United States not to have actively disrupted and destroyed
this anti-civilizational international terror network. Should the
violation of international human rights and warfare norms
delegitimize an undertaking that was designed solely to protect the
Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Def., to Gen. Richard
Myers et al. (Oct. 16, 2003), available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeldmemo.htm.
66 Both of which are proscribed by the United Nations Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
and signed by President Reagan on April 18, 1988 and ratified by the United
States Senate on October 27, 1990. See Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res.
39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51, at 197 (June
26, 1987).
67 Eyder Peralta, New Poll Finds U.S. Viewed Less Favorably in Arab World, NPR
(Jul. 13, 2011, 2:11 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/07/
18/137821453/new-poll-finds-u-s-viewed-less-favorably-in-arab-world.
65
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United States and the international system from terror networks like
Al-Qaeda? After all, aren’t the first victims of Islamic extremists
innocent women, girls and moderate Muslims who seek to integrate
their countries within the international system? And didn’t Lincoln
countenance far worse during the American Civil War in order to
fulfill the far more pressing imperative of preserving the Union?

IX. LESSONS FROM LINCOLN

Lincoln’s conduct as Commander-in-Chief was premised on
the sole objective of preserving the Union.68 Indeed, during the Civil
War, the “‘predominant purpose’ of all federal operations was the
political goal of reestablishing U.S. government authority over the
states that had seceded from the Union.”69 With that goal in place, the
Lincoln administration countenanced the use of harsh and illegal
measures in the process of defeating the Confederacy. This included
President Lincoln’s implementation of an illegal suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus notwithstanding Chief Justice Taney’s opinion
in Ex Parte Merryman, which confirmed the text of the United States
Constitution Article I’s Suspension Clause and held the President has
no authority to unilaterally suspend habeas corpus rights.70 In total,
Lincoln’s suspension of the writ resulted in 38,000 civilians being
arrested and held by the military without trial and judicial review.71
Among those arrested were prominent members of American society,

See BURRUS M. CARNAHAN, LINCOLN ON TRIAL: SOUTHERN CIVILIANS AND
9 (The University Press of Kentucky 2010); see also Robert
Fabrikant, Lincoln, Emancipation, and “Military Necessity”: Review of Burrus M.
Carnahan’s Act of Justice, Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation and the Law of
War, 52 HOW. L.J. 375, 377 (2009).
69 Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins and
Limits of the Principle of the Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 213, 222 (1998).
70 Joseph Margulies, Evaluating Crisis Government, 40 No. 6 CRIM. L. BULL., art.
5, 5-8 (2004).
71 Aaron L. Jackson, Habeas Corpus in the Global War on Terror: An American
Drama, 65 A.F. L. REV. 263, 266 (2010).
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including a newspaper editor who publicly criticized the actions of
President Lincoln when he took office.72 Professor Scott Sullivan
writes:
Lincoln’s execution of the Civil War
demonstrated little patience with legal niceties that
could potentially impede his prosecution of the war
effort. Some of Lincoln’s most controversial acts
include unilaterally suspending habeas corpus rights
in parts of the Confederacy, engaging in military action
that was unsanctioned by Congress, embracing the
concept of total war that led to the burning of Atlanta
by General Sherman’s troops, and ordering a military
blockade
in
the
absence
of
congressional
73
authorization.
The Lincoln Administration, moreover, countenanced both the
retaliatory killing of innocent civilians and destruction of civilian
property within the Confederate States.74 Sullivan writes:
The rights-restricting actions imposed during
the ongoing war on terror have been much more
restrained than that of the Civil War. Unlike Lincoln’s
broad grants of power to military commanders to
suspend habeas corpus as they saw fit, there has been
no suspension of the right of habeas corpus. The
detention facilities at the U.S. Naval Station at
Guantanamo Bay compare quite favorably to the harsh
treatment and occasional summary execution suffered
during the Civil War. Similarly, President Bush has
received Congressional authorization for each major
military operation in which his administration
engaged, despite his clear belief that such assent is
Constitutionally unnecessary.75
Id.
Scott Sullivan, International Law and Domestic Legitimacy: Remarks Prepared
for Lincoln’s Constitutionalism in Time of War: Lessons for the Current War on
Terror? 12 CHAP. L. REV. 489, 490 (2009); see also CARNAHAN, supra note 67, at
109.
74 CARNAHAN, supra note 68, at 60-62.
75 Sullivan, supra note 73, at 491.
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The political paradigm faced by Lincoln, however, differs
markedly from that which was presented to Presidents Bush and
Obama. Lincoln prosecuted an unequivocal war of necessity to
preserve the Union and did so at a time when both international law
and the laws of war were in their infancy. Robert Fabrikant writes:
Prior to the Civil War there were no international
conventions laying out the law of war. To say that
international law was in its infancy at that point would
be an understatement. There was no accepted legal
code that embodied international law, including the
law of war. European countries had a loose, and
entirely unenforceable, set of understandings
extending back millennia to which they resorted in the
context of resolving commercial, not military, disputes.
These understandings were referred to as customs and
usages, but there was no universal agreement as to
their content or meaning.
The international law of war was even less
undeveloped than its commercial counterpart. The
legal thinking which existed in this realm came largely,
perhaps exclusively, in the form of scholarly writings.
Naturally, these writings conflicted with one another,
and they had no binding effect.76
Unlike the Civil War, where international public opinion
counted for very little, the War on Terror, set in a very different media
age, was subjected to heightened public scrutiny. By way of example,
Congress’ bipartisan 9-11 Commission concluded allegations that the
United States abused prisoners in its custody “make it harder to build
the diplomatic, political, and military alliances the government will
need [for] a successful counterterrorism strategy.”77 According to a
report by the United States Senate Armed Services Committee, “[t]he
76 Fabrikant, supra note 68, at 388-89 (2009); see also Sullivan, supra note 73, at
494-95.
77 Keith A. Petty, Beyond the Court of Public Opinion: Military Commissions and
the Reputational Pull of Compliance Theory, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 303, 319 (2011)
(quoting 9-11 COMMISSION REPORT 379 (2004), available at http://www.911commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf).
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fact that America is seen in a negative light by so many complicates
our ability to attract allies to our side, strengthens the hand of our
enemies, and reduces our ability to collect intelligence that can save
lives.”78 In short, United States policymakers have failed to place the
country “in front” of its international obligations to its overall
detriment.
This is in marked contrast to the United States
government’s behavior in Lincoln’s time.
First, Lincoln successfully rebutted Confederate claims to selfdetermination by spearheading a war effort to delegitimize
slaveholding as an aspect of Southern identity worthy of selfdetermination. Second, it was Lincoln himself who first codified Dr.
Francis Lieber’s Instruction for the Government of Armies of the
United States on the Field, originally published as General Orders No.
100, War Department, Adjutant General’s office - the first ever
codification of the Laws of War- commonly known as the Lieber
Code, named after its drafter.79 The Lieber Code was the foundation
for similar law of war codifications in Prussia, the Netherlands,
France, Russia, Spain and Great Britain.80 “It was also an important
influence at the conferences of Brussels in 1874 and at the Hague in
1899 and 1907” and led to the eventual formulation and adoption of
the Hague Conventions in 1907, which formalized and circumscribed
the behavior of belligerents.81 How important was the Lieber Code?
A half century after the Civil War, in his opening address as President
of the American Society of International Law, former Secretary of
State and Nobel Laureate Elihu Root said the following:

U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVS. COMM., Senate Armed Services Inquiry into the
Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, at xxv (Nov. 20, 2008), available at
http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/Publications/Detainee%
20Report%20Final_April%2022%202009.pdf.
79 Carnahan, supra note 69, at 213; see also Theodor Meron, Francis Lieber’s
Code and Principles of Humanity, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 269, 270 (1997).
80 Gideon M. Hart, Military Commissions and the Lieber Code: Toward a New
Understanding of the Jurisdictional Foundations of Military Commissions, 203 MIL.
L. REV. 1, 4 (2010).
81 Id.; see also Heinz Klug, The Rule of Law, War, or Terror, 2003 WIS. L. REV.
365, 369-70 (2003).
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[W]hile the instrument was a practical presentation of
what the laws and usages of war were, and not a
technical discussion of what the writer thought they
ought to be, in all its parts may be discerned an
instinctive selection of the best and most humane
practice and an assertion of the control of morals to the
limit permitted by the dreadful business in which the
rules were to be applied.82

The foremost scholar on Lincoln’s actions as Commander-inChief, Burrus M. Carnahan, writes:
Drafted by an academic intent on drawing
general principles of human morality from empirical
evidence, and issued by a President determined to
found his policies on human reason, the Lieber Code
may be considered the final product of the eighteenthcentury movement to humanize war through the
application of reason. From this standpoint, the Lieber
Code’s greatest theoretical contribution to the modern
law of war was its identification of military necessity as
a general legal principle to limit violence, in the
absence of any other rule.83
Because it was signed and approved by President Lincoln, the
Lieber Code enabled the United States Army to present itself as the
world leader in respect of army conduct. No other western army had
previously limited the conduct of its soldiers on the battlefield like the
U.S. Army ostensibly did while conducting a war for the nation’s very
survival.84
It would be going too far to say that President Lincoln’s
adoption of the Lieber Code hamstrung the effectiveness of United
States armies. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that Civil War
combatants paid little attention to the Code’s requirements.85
82 Meron, supra note 79, at 271 (quoting Elihu Root, Opening Address at the
Seven Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr.
24, 1913), reprinted in 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 453, 456 (1913)).
83 Carnahan, supra note 69, at 213.
84 Id.
85 Hart, supra note 80, at 46.
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Moreover, to the extent it was followed, Article 15 of the Code set
forth that Union forces were to be guided by the Military Necessity
Doctrine, which, left broad authority to military commanders to
pursue their objective to preserve the Union.86 The Military Necessity
Doctrine grants considerable latitude to the military in the face of its
enemy and even civilians. It even allows for a quarantining of a
civilian population and, at times, the collective punishment of civilian
non-combatants.87 Indeed, its very expansiveness led many to see it
as little more than a means for providing an ethical justification for a
Carthaginian-style destruction of the States comprising the
Confederacy.88
However, as Professor Carnahan writes, “recognition of
military necessity as a legal precondition for destruction represented
an enlightened advance in the laws of war in the nineteenth
century.”89 This is because “the law of nations permitted the capture
or destruction of any and all property belonging to any person owing
allegiance to an enemy government, whether or not these measures
were linked to military needs.”90 Indeed, even with respect to the
overall parlous civilian treatment by Union Armies, Carnahan writes:
There is a continuing debate over whether the Civil
War was the first “modern war” or “total war,” the
precursor of the world wars of the twentieth century.
Most historians agree, however, that in one crucial
respect the Civil War differed from total wars of the
last century. Except in retaliation for unlawful acts of
the enemy, the organized armies on both sides did not
target civilians for deliberate killing. Inhabitants of the
Warsaw Ghetto, Nanking, or Tokyo in World War II,
or Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s,
surely would gladly have exchanged places with

See Id.
See Id.
88 Hart, supra note 80, at 47.
89 Carnahan, supra note 69, at 217.
90 Id.
86

87
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Southern civilians in the path of Hunter, Sherman, or
Sheridan in 1864.91

To Lincoln, the most fundamental limitation on military
necessity was that it could be invoked only to attain a particular
military objective and never solely a political one.92 Notwithstanding
today’s legal suppositions as to self-determination, he was guided
solely by his goal of preserving the Union in a manner that evidenced,
to a degree, solicitude and respect for the rule of law under the United
States Constitution.93 Lincoln, however, was governed by objectives
outside of mere military necessity and the “fundamental distinction
between combatants and noncombatants was maintained throughout
the war.”94
By way of example, by proposing that special
consideration be given to private homes, Lincoln adumbrated the
1907 Hague Regulations on land warfare, the 1907 Convention on
naval bombardment, and Protocol Additional I to the Geneva
Conventions that all prohibit any attack on undefended dwellings.
Included within the doctrine of military necessity was the need to
take measures to ensure public order and safety.95 This foreshadowed
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations that “declared the obligation of
an occupying commander to ‘take all the measures in his power to
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country.’”96
Lincoln’s prosecution of the war was enhanced not only by the
necessity of prosecuting what clearly was a civil war for the nation’s
survival, but by his placing the U.S. out front of its international
obligations by promulgation of the Emancipation Proclamation,
which effectively rebutted the Southern claim of self-determination
and his adoption of the Lieber Code. This careful positioning of the
CARNAHAN, supra note 68, at 109.
Carnahan, supra note 69, at 219.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 228.
95 See id. (recognizing that President Lincoln insisted on refraining from
destroying property to harass members of the opposition).
96 Id. at 224.
91
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U.S. with respect to international law and international public opinion
is a lesson that has largely been lost by today’s U.S.leaders.

X. THE CURRENT WAR ON TERROR AND LINCOLN

Unlike Lincoln who if anything, waged a war of absolute
necessity to insure the continued survival of the Union, the Bush
Administration chose to wage an absolute “war of choice” against
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Not only was the Iraq War an unjustifiable
response to the 9/11 Al Qaeda terrorist attacks, but it was carelessly
and illegally executed after its supposed justification was rejected by
the United Nations Security Council.97 This diverted resources from
the then-nascent Afghanistan occupation, cost thousands of lives,
much treasure and complicated Iraq’s eventual transition to a stable
democracy.
Although the Obama Administration was warmly received by
the international community – to the point where the forty-fourth
President was prematurely and embarrassingly awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize during his first year in office – its continued use of
Predator Drones to kill suspected terrorists, regardless of civilian
casualties, and its failure to close the detention facility in Guantanamo
Bay has compromised the effectiveness of its strategy in Afghanistan
and worsened already problematic relations with a nuclear armed
and unstable Pakistan. These failures have harmed the Obama
Administration’s strategic imperative, which is to engender
international cooperation from our allies to share the costs of ensuring
international peace and relocate the focus of American foreign and
security policy from the Middle East and Afghanistan/Pakistan

Peter Slevin & Dana Priest, Wolfowitz Concedes Iraq Errors, WASH. POST, Jul.
24, 2003, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A374682003Jul23.html.
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region toward the dynamic Asia Pacific Region.98 This is necessitated
by a decline in relative American power, the need to engage an
increasingly powerful and assertive China and ensure an established
American presence in the world’s fastest growing economic region.
Due largely to the perception of American unilateralism and
lawlessness though, both the Bush and Obama Administrations have
been unable to fully engage the international community to deal with
matters of obvious global concern.99 Sullivan writes:
In the war on terror, international law, and
especially international humanitarian law, has played a
crucial role in providing the previously established
standards in the most fevered debates over detention
policy and accepted means of interrogation. The
primacy of international law in these realms is
somewhat
surprising
given
the
American
predisposition to dismiss the importance of
international law generally. In spite of this general
attitude to such law, I believe that international law has
acted as a cornerstone here in gauging the legitimacy
of state action as a general matter. This is due to the
greater incorporation into a rights-oriented regime
affecting traditionally domestic concerns combined
with (1) its place as an external benchmark of executive
action; and (2) the absence of domestically embedded

See Robert Burns & Julie Pace, Obama to Talk Afghanistan Drawdown,
Announce Return of 34,000 Troops in a Year, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 12, 2013,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/12/obamaafghanistan_n_2669267.html; see also Ed Kiernan, Huge Military Exercise
Highlights “Rebalancing of U.S. Policy Toward Asia,” NBC NEWS (Feb. 15, 2013),
http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/15/16973088-hugemilitary-exercise-highlights-rebalancing-of-us-policy-toward-asia?lite.
99 See GEIR LUNDESTAD, JUST ANOTHER MAJOR CRISIS?: THE UNITED STATES AND
EUROPE SINCE 2000, 177, 256 (Oxford University Press 2008) (“The aggressive
unilateralism of U.S. policy, the rejection of international rules and
multilateral institutions that has characterized the response to 9/11, and the
anti-European undertones of American officials and commentators have
weakened American prestige and legitimacy.”).
98

WAR ON TERROR – LESSONS FROM LINCOLN

41

rules and standards acting contrary to the thrust of
international law.100
The consequences of United States policymakers’ failure to
recognize this as well as the importance of global public opinion have
been severe. By way of example, the Obama Administration has been
unable to obtain United Nations Security Council’s cooperation to
deal with the present humanitarian catastrophe in the Syrian Arab
Republic.101 The Administration’s proposed sanctions against Bashar
al-Assad’s Alawite regime were vetoed by two Security Council
Permanent Members, the Russian Federation and the People’s
Republic of China.102
Recognizing these states have interests
completely separate from those of the United States, including a
strategic interest in reasserting a non-interventionist paradigm, both
countries were able to veto the proposed measure with a impunity
due to the international community’s increased skepticism as to
American motives. This, of course, provides no comfort to the Syrian
people and their advocates, who must turn increasingly to an
assertive Republic of Turkey to potentially fulfill the United Nations’
Responsibility to Protect.103
Similarly, the United States, by any international standard,
was entitled to protect itself by killing the Al-Qaeda leadership,
including Osama bin Laden, who was killed by a United States Navy
Sullivan, supra note 73, at 494 (footnote omitted).
Press release, U.S. Mission to the United Nations No. 2012/081,
Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, at the Adoption of UN Security
Council Resolution 2042 (Apr. 14, 2012), available at http://usun.state.gov/
briefing/statements/187914.htm.
102 Paul Harris et al., Syria Resolution Vetoed by Russia and China at United
Nations, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 4, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2012/feb/04/assad-obama-resign-un-resolution.
103 Syria Unrest: Turkey Says UN “Supports” Repression, BBC NEWS (Apr. 3,
2012, 3:39 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17602136
Conditions for Ceasefire Appear Unstable Amid Expanding Violence, INT’L
COALITION FOR THE RESP. TO PROTECT (Apr. 11, 2012),
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/ar
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Seal Team on May 2, 2011, while at his compound in Abbottabad,
Pakistan, situated close to the Pakistan Military Academy. Although
the Obama Administration deserves credit for risking its prestige to
kill him, the fact Bin Laden was comfortably housed in Pakistan near
a prominent military academy raises the very troubling question of
how Pakistani political culture views its United States backer and aid
donor.104
The Eurozone Debt Crisis is another case in point. To date, the
United States has spent at least $2 trillion on the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan.105 This expense stands in marked contrast with United
States Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s April 2012 refusal to
donate any money to the International Monetary Fund’s request for
emergency funds to deal with the Eurozone debt crisis. It is, to this
writer, evidence of the United States government’s failure that it
continues to spend large sums in an area that is tangentially related to
American prosperity and security, while at the same time refusing to
spend any money on a problem that is central to this objective. As the
Financial Times’ Chief Foreign Affairs Correspondent Gideon
Rachman recently wrote, the United States' unwillingness to address
the Eurozone debt crisis is due to a lack of available resources and a
collapse in American prestige and influence. He writes:
So what has changed? A lack of money is a
large part of the problem.
America spent the
equivalent of 5 per cent of its gross domestic product
on the Marshall Plan. That is not feasible now. Tim
Geithner, the US Treasury secretary, frequently urges
his European colleagues to do much more to solve the

Troubling Questions on Bin Laden, TIMES FREE PRESS, May 8, 2011,
http://timesfreepress.com/news/2011/may/08/troubling-questions-binladen/; see also Benjy Sarlin, Pakistan Under Harsh Scrutiny in Wake of Raid on
Bin Laden Compound, TALKING POINTS MEMO (May 3, 2011, 10:12 AM),
http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/05/pakistan-under-harshscrutiny-in-wake-of-raid-on-bin-laden-compound.php.
105 Alan Zarembo, Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan Wars Will Keep Mounting, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/29/nation/lana-0329-war-costs-20130329.
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debt crisis. But, while he can speak softly, he is not
carrying a big cheque book.
However, American leadership has not always
relied on cash. The “committee to save the world” did
not spend a huge amount of money. But it was
operating in a different period. Less than a decade
after the collapse of the Soviet Union – and with the
American economy booming – US policymakers had
the credibility and the confidence to lead. In large part,
that is lacking today. The financial crisis has taken its
toll on America’s ability to persuade, as well as on its
finances.106
To this, I would add the War on Terror.
The current United States predicament is well-stated by
Associate Justice Stephen G. Breyer, who, in an address to the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, said the following:
The Constitution always matters, perhaps particularly
so in times of emergency. . . . Security needs may well
matter, playing a major role in determining just where
the proper constitutional balance lies. It is this proper
constitutional balance of both civil liberties and
national security that our three co-equal branches of
government have worked rigorously to attain amidst
the current wartime climate.107
Breyer, however, fails to take account of the international
perspective. Like it or not, America’s War on Terror requires a broad
level of international legitimacy and support that cannot succeed if
based on domestic concerns alone. Accordingly, although use of
military commissions to try alleged terrorists is constitutional and
106 Gideon Rachman, America, Greece and a World on Fire, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 16,
2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0ec863ec-3e30-11e1-ac9b00144feabdc0.html# axzz2QNbkB7Rj.
107 Frank J. Williams et al., Still a Frightening Unknown: Achieving a
Constitutional Balance Between Civil Liberties and National Security During the
War on Terror, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 675, 678 (2007) (footnotes
omitted).
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may be the only option available to the Obama administration in view
of domestic politics, it works against the United States' interest in
engendering global cooperation and assistance in the War on Terror.
The Honorable Frank Williams, Chief Justice of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court states the following, the facts of which are
incontrovertible:
Criticism surrounding the Bush administration’s
decisions about how to safeguard the United States
seems to these writers to be particularly ill-founded
when one considers that the President’s actions pale in
comparison to actions taken by prior presidents, such
as Abraham Lincoln, who, despite his widespread
suspension of habeas corpus, is still ranked among the
nation’s greatest leaders. Lincoln’s actions, although
radical, were necessary during the Civil War, as now,
when grave national security problems were
pandemic.
Almost 150 years later, the Bush administration,
like Lincoln, is faced with yet another grave national
emergency that requires unpopular decisions.108
Correct as Judge Williams may be, his analysis partly misses
the point. President Lincoln’s war against the Confederacy was not
only a war of necessity, but one that involved solely domestic actors.
It was, after all, a civil war. Second, the war was conducted before the
development of international jurisprudence regarding the conduct of
armies on the battlefield and, to the extent that such requirements
were extant, President Lincoln placed the United States Army “in
front” of the issue by his adoption of the Lieber Code and its military
necessity doctrine. None of these factors apply to the Bush and
Obama administrations. Although the Bush administration had
strong international support for the initial invasion of Afghanistan,
the support for United States presence in Afghanistan has dissipated
due to both the length of the endeavor and a perception that the
United States public, its politicians and military pay insufficient
108
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attention to both the needs and safety of Afghan civilians, who are
increasingly caught between the corruption and incompetence of the
Karzai government and the brutality and viciousness of the Taliban
insurgents. Perhaps equally important, United States legitimacy in
the “War on Terror” was undermined by the largely unilateral
invasion of Iraq against the will of the international community.
Although the Saddam Hussein regime was almost unique in its
barbarity, the United States claim of pre-emption was viewed as
incredible by both United States allies and the international
community. The United States’ subsequent failure to ensure the
safety of Iraqi civilians after the invasion cost it further international
legitimacy and support. Perhaps most significantly, the Bush and
Obama administrations’ focus in waging the “War on Terror” has
been based solely on domestic political legitimacy when the
endeavor’s success requires greater international support and
cooperation.
Andrew Kent writes, “the clear trend in the Court and legal
academy is globalist—viewing the reach of the Constitution’s
protection of individuals as unaffected by geography, citizenship or
hostility to the United States and construing the document as if it
were an international human rights instrument.”109 Indeed, these are
requirements of an increasingly active global political culture and
civil society. This heightened scrutiny did not restrict the U.S. Army
during Lincoln’s time, but it does today. The United States' failure to
recognize this fact accounts in large measure for the decline in its
geopolitical position.

XI. CAUTIONARY ASPECTS TO LINCOLN’S LEGACY

This is not to say that Lincoln’s legacy is unblemished. Far
from it. Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief needlessly countenanced
Andrew Kent, The Constitution and the Laws of War During the Civil War, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1844 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
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actions by Union troops that delegitimized the Union war effort and
made his eventual goal of reintegrating the Confederacy into the
Union more difficult. By way of example, Lincoln’s unauthorized
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus greatly and perhaps
needlessly delegitimized the Union war effort.
Although Lincoln adopted the Lieber Code and required the
U.S. Army to abide by the military necessity doctrine, this still left
ample room for abuse of Southern civilians to the overall detriment of
both Southerners and the United States government, which sought to
subsequently reintegrate the Confederate States into the Union. The
Lieber Code’s military necessity doctrine countenanced the starving
of the enemy, whether armed or unarmed, in order to effectuate its
speedier subjugation.110 It also allowed Union forces to both drive
civilians back into a besieged city that is short of provisions, so as to
hasten surrender and, if necessary, deny quarter when one’s
“salvation makes it impossible to cumber” oneself with prisoners.111
Notwithstanding the Lieber Code’s application, the U.S. Army
ensured that Southern civilians and infrastructure paid a heavy price
for the Confederate rebellion against the Union. Southern cities were
besieged and burned, and civilian life and property were often
disregarded.112
Moreover, Lincoln’s critics note that his claim to have acted to
free the slaves is belied by his failure to enunciate the Emancipation
Proclamation until this was necessitated by Congressional radical
Republicans and only after the continued support of Union
slaveholding States became less critical.113 As William Klingaman
points out, the President's decision to issue the emancipation
proclamation “was a gamble born of desperation and frustration from
repeated military failures.”114 Indeed, at the outset of his presidency,
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“Lincoln supported a constitutional amendment barring the federal
government from touching slavery in states where it already
existed.”115 Perhaps this was little more than acknowledgment of
both a political and strategic reality. That said, the fact Lincoln
countenanced slavery in Border States such as Kentucky, Delaware,
Missouri and Maryland and refused to emancipate slaves in certain
conquered portions of the Confederacy, contrary to the requirements
of the Lieber Code, has propitiated the claim, heard in the South to
this day, that the Civil War had more to do with “northern
aggression” than slavery. This has permitted a siege mentality to
thrive as part of Southern identity that has hindered a more complete
integration of African Americans with Southern Whites. These
problematic aspects to Lincoln’s legacy evidence how difficult the
United States' current predicament is, especially since its eventual
success will require winning not only the battle for global public
opinion, but sufficient “hearts and minds” within the Islamic world to
delegitimize and neuter anti-civilizational Muslim radicals such as AlQaeda.

CONCLUSION

The United States' national interest in this globalized, postfinancial crisis world is to remediate many long-neglected domestic
problems, including a faltering education system, unemployment,
stagnant wages, income inequality, and falling international
competitiveness. To a degree, these challenges cannot feasibly be
addressed so long as the United States continues to bear almost the
entire cost of maintaining international peace and security. Its allies
will be less likely to share these costs if the United States is seen as
unilateral, aggressive and indifferent to ensuring international human
rights. American actions in both Iraq and Afghanistan largely
perceived as negligent and without regard for civilian welfare, have
115
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harmed its international reputation and hindered cooperation from
United States allies and strategic partners. As a consequence, the
United States now finds it more difficult to obtain international
assistance in its goal of peaceable disengagement from the Middle
East and South Asia. Although the brutality of the Civil War has been
unsurpassed in United States history, Lincoln’s actions as
Commander-in-Chief were undertaken to fulfill the compelling
interest of preserving the Union before either global public opinion or
international law became relevant to the war’s legitimacy. Indeed, to
the extent international standards were relevant, President Lincoln
shrewdly placed the United States ahead of the curve by taking a
strong stand against slavery and by his adoption of the Lieber Code to
govern the conduct of U.S. armies in the field. That said, the
viciousness of the war effort, while it facilitated the United States'
immediate goal of restoring the Union, worked against the long-term
goal of ensuring a stable rapprochement between North and South.
It is a complicated predicament. While the United States must
protect its citizens and territory from terrorist attacks, it cannot do so
in a manner that alienates world public opinion and engenders
antipathy. These were lessons well understood by United States
leaders from both major political parties during the twentieth century,
when United States actions corresponded with an interest in ensuring
international stability, free markets and democratization. Examples
include the United States' actions as the leading democracy against
the Axis Powers during World War II, aid to Greece and Turkey and
the Marshall Plan in the immediate post-war aftermath, its key
support for the nascent European Coal and Steel Community that
developed into today’s European Union, its support for
democratization and open markets in South Korea and Japan, the
opening to China that led to several hundred million Chinese being
freed from poverty, its actions as the leading democracy in opposition
to the Soviet Union during the Cold War and its critical intervention
on behalf of German unification at the Cold War’s end. The key to
United States success in the twentieth century was not only the
country’s unmatched economic and military might, but the
preponderant international perception that United States interests
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corresponded with a more open and prosperous world. It remains in
the United States' interest to see a more stable and prosperous world,
albeit one in which the costs of global security are shared more
equitably by emerging and mature powers that have a stake in world
stability. The challenge for United States policymakers is to ensure
United States policies reflect these interests.

